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Semantically-similar labels that co-occur in child-directed speech (e.g., bunny-rabbit) are
more likely to promote inductive generalization in preschoolers than non-co-occurring
labels (e.g., lamb-sheep). However, it remains unclear whether this effect stems from
co-occurrence or other factors, and how co-occurrence contributes to generalization.
To address these issues, preschoolers were exposed to a stream of semantically-
similar labels that don’t co-occur in natural language, but were arranged to co-occur
in the experimental setting. In Experiment 1, children exposed to the co-occurring
stream were more likely to make category-consistent inferences than children in two
control conditions. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and provided evidence that
co-occurrence training influenced generalization only when the trained labels were
categorically-similar. These findings suggest that both co-occurrence information and
semantic representations contribute to preschool-age children’s inductive generalization.
The findings are discussed in relation to the developmental accounts of inductive
generalization.
Keywords: cognitive development, inductive generalization, semantic development, label co-occurrence
Introduction
Adistinctive feature of human cognition is the ability tomake inferences that are based on knowledge
of taxonomic hierarchies. For example, if told that a robin has omat genes, which would be more
likely to have omat genes, a penguin or a squirrel? While no definitive answer can be reached given
the available data, one might infer that the penguin is more likely to have this property, as it belongs
to the category that includes robins but not squirrels (i.e., birds). Such category-based induction is
thought to provide a powerful tool by which to navigate the world (e.g., Gelman andMarkman, 1986;
Osherson et al., 1990; Murphy and Ross, 2010).
Prior research has documented adults’ consistent use of category information in inductive
generalization, but a key question concerns the developmental course of this ability (Badger
and Shapiro, 2012). Many studies investigating this question have concluded that, similar to
adults, young children’s inductive generalizations are based on identifying a common category
that includes the presented items (e.g., Gelman and Coley, 1990; Gelman and Medin, 1993;
Welder and Graham, 2001; Jaswal, 2004; Booth et al., 2005; Jaswal and Markman, 2007).
For example, in their seminal study, Gelman and Markman, 1986; Experiment 2) provided
preschool-age children the opportunity to generalize a property from two test items (e.g.,
a “squirrel” and a “bunny”) to a target object (e.g., a “rabbit”). The stimuli were selected
such that visual information alone was insufficient to make the inference and category
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information was conveyed by synonymous1 labels (e.g.,
bunny–rabbit). The results indicated that children made
category-based inferences at above chance level.
Traditionally, these findings have been interpreted as evidence
that children’s generalizations are category-based: Putatively, the
only reason children would consistently generalize properties
from a “bunny” to a “rabbit” is because these labels refer to
similar kinds. However, it has been recently proposed that some
synonymous labels used in prior research not only referred
to objects of similar kind but also were likely to co-occur in
child-directed speech (Fisher, 2010). According to the CHILDES
database (MacWhinney, 2000) the following label-pairs used in
Gelman and Markman’s (1986) study co-occurred in natural
speech of children or their caregivers: bunny-rabbit, puppy-dog,
and kitty-cat; whereas other label-pairs used in this study were
unlikely to co-occur (e.g., rock-stone, cobra-snake, desert-sand).
This label co-occurrence provided another source of information
(in addition to semantic similarity) on which to base an inference.
To examine whether children’s generalizations vary as a
function of label co-occurrence, Fisher et al. (2011) presented
a group of 4-year-old children with a property induction
task with both co-occurring synonyms (e.g., bunny-rabbit) and
non-co-occurring synonyms (e.g., alligator-crocodile); label type
was manipulated within-participants. Importantly, following the
property induction task children’s knowledge of all labels used
in the study was tested in a task similar to the Peabody Picture
Vocabulary Test (Dunn and Dunn, 1997). Despite apparent
familiarity with all of the labels used in the study (i.e., children’s
accuracy in the vocabulary knowledge test was 99% for both types
of labels) 4-year-old childrenweremore likely to provide category-
consistent responses in the co-occurring labels condition than in
the non-co-occurring labels condition (74%, above chance, and
51%, no different from chance, respectively). In contrast, adults
were nearly at ceiling in giving category-consistent responses
with both co-occurring and non-co-occurring labels. Analyses
of individual patterns of responses revealed that only a small
minority of 4-year-old children (35% of the sample) consistently
provided category-consistent responses with non-co-occurring
labels, whereas these same children were significantly more likely
to provide category-consistent responses with co-occurring labels
(75% of the sample).
A follow-up study replicated these findings, and ruled out the
possibility that children’s knowledge of offspring-parent relations
underlies children’s superior induction performance with co-
occurring synonyms (Godwin et al., 2013). For example, in
this study 100% of 4-year-old children were able to correctly
identify a “sheep” as “lamb’s mother” in a kinship knowledge
task. However, the same children were unlikely to make category-
consistent inferences in a property induction task (i.e., the rate of
category-consistent inferences for the lamb-sheep trial was only
50%). Similar to the Fisher et al. (2011) study, the same children
succeeded inmaking inferences with co-occurring labels, with the
1Very few labels share 100% overlap in meaning. Following Gelman and
Markman (1986), in this paper we use the term “synonymous” to refer to labels
that are semantically similar rather than semantically equivalent, for the sake
of brevity.
rate of category-consistent responses ranging from 75 to 90% for
co-occurring label-pairs.
Taken together, these studies suggest that category-consistent
responding on generalization tasks is limited to small subset
of synonymous labels. However, two issues remain unresolved.
First, it is unclear whether differences in performance with co-
occurring and non-co-occurring labels observed in prior studies
stemmed from label co-occurrence or from other factors. Second,
if co-occurrence indeed contributes to children’s generalization,
the mechanism of this effect remains unclear.
In this paper, we consider two possible ways in which
co-occurrence information may contribute to inductive
generalization. One possibility has been articulated in Fisher
(2010) and Fisher et al. (2011). Specifically, co-occurrence has
been shown to give rise to strong lexical associations (Brown and
Berko, 1960; McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992); therefore, it is possible
that children’s generalization with co-occurring labels was the
result of associative lexical priming rather than category-based
reasoning. Under this interpretation, when children extend
a property of a “bunny” to a “rabbit,” it is not because they
reason that bunnies and rabbits are the same kind of animal;
rather, the label “bunny” may prime the label “rabbit” during
the course of the task. A strong version of this proposal suggests
that co-occurrence information alone, in the absence of high
semantic similarity, may be sufficient to promote generalization
via associative lexical priming. For brevity, we will refer to this
possibility as the Co-occurrence-Only Hypothesis.
Another possibility is that co-occurrence statistics interact with
semantic similarity. In natural language, label co-occurrence and
semantic similarity are not independent: Words with similar
meaning tend to occur in similar linguistic contexts. Landauer
and Dumais (1997) proposed that semantic representations can
be extracted based solely on the co-occurrence statistics in speech
input through the process referred to as Latent Semantic Analysis.
Landauer and Dumais used long-range co-occurrence statistics
(i.e., co-occurrences within a window of up to 70 words) to
successfully simulate acquisition of new vocabulary in school-
age children. Older children and adults may be able to take
advantage of long-range co-occurrences to refine the existing
representations or build new ones. For example, if an article
discussing rare orchids mentions that miltonia is native to Brazil
and Argentina, one’s representation of orchids may become
elaborated to includemiltonia. However, young childrenmay only
be able to take advantage of short-range co-occurrence statistics
due to limitations in working and short-term memory. Under
this interpretation, label co-occurrence may influence inductive
generalization by increasing semantic similarity; therefore, co-
occurrence information alone (i.e., when overlap in semantic
features is low) may be insufficient to influence children’s
generalization. We will refer to this possibility as the Interaction
Hypothesis.
The present studywas designed to address both issues discussed
above. Specifically, in the present study, we directly tested whether
co-occurrence training can influence preschoolers’ inductive
generalization with semantically similar labels that failed to elicit
reliable category-consistent responding in prior research (Fisher,
2010; Fisher et al., 2011; Godwin et al., 2013). Another goal was
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to examine how co-occurrence may contribute to generalization.
Toward these goals, we used an experimental approach often
employed in the statistical learning literature (e.g.,Saffran et al.,
1996, 1998; Aslin et al., 1998). In statistical learning studies,
participants are typically exposed to an auditory speech stream
consisting of a string of repeating nonsense syllables that comprise
words of an artificial language. Within the speech stream, some
of the syllables have low transitional probabilities, whereas other
syllables have high transitional probabilities. The speech stream is
often designed such that the only cues to the word boundaries are
the transitional probabilities of each syllable. Following exposure
to the speech stream, the participants’ task is to discriminate
between “words” and “part-words” of the artificial language.
Transitional probability is one way of capturing the co-
occurrence relation of units in a language (Aslin et al., 1998). In
the present study we adapted the statistical learning paradigm by
replacing nonsense syllables with non-co-occurring semantically
similar labels. We exposed preschool-age children to a speech
stream that consisted of four semantically similar label-pairs that
are highly familiar to young children but unlikely to co-occur
in natural language (e.g., dolphin-whale, sofa-couch, mountain-
hill, glove-mitten). The transitional probability within each label-
pair was 100% and the transitional probability between the
pairs was 33% (Co-occurrence Training). In Experiment 1, a
second speech stream consisting of the same label-pairs was
created, but the labels were arranged such that the semantically
similar labels did not co-occur despite being presented at equal
frequency to the co-occurring stream (Frequency Training).
After being exposed to one of the two speech streams, children
were presented with an inductive generalization task identical
to that in Fisher et al. (2011) and Godwin et al. (2013). If
label co-occurrence influences children’s inductive inferences,
children who were exposed to the co-occurring stream should
be more likely to choose category-consistent test items than
children who were exposed to the frequency stream, as well
as a group of children who were not exposed to either speech
stream (No Training Baseline). We also predicted that, because
the Frequency Training consisted of semantically similar labels
that had low transitional probability, children in the Frequency
Training condition would perform no different than chance level.
These predictions were tested in Experiment 1. Experiment 2
replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and tested the source of
co-occurrence effects on generalization (i.e., Co-occurrence-Only
Hypothesis vs. the Interaction Hypothesis) by presenting children
with a training speech stream inwhich co-occurrencewas induced
for semantically dissimilar items.
Experiment 1
Materials and Methods
Participants
Participants were 62 four-year-old children (M = 4.55 years,
SD = 0.33 years, 32 females, 30 males) recruited from preschools
in a large metropolitan area. The Institutional Review Board
at Carnegie Mellon University approved the study, and
parents/guardians of all children provided informed written
consent before participation. One child was excluded from
TABLE 1 | Complete list of linguistic stimuli (note that each set was
presented twice during the induction phase, paired with a different blank
predicate on each presentation).
Trial no Target items Related test items Lures Blank predicates
1 Sofa Couch Chair Matlen
2 Mountain Hill Forest Troxel
3 Dolphin Whale Seal Creighan
4 Glove Mitten Sweater Koski
5 Mountain Hill Forest Erwin
6 Sofa Couch Chair Lignin
7 Glove Mitten Sweater Higa
8 Dolphin Whale Seal Omat
analysis because of a developmental delay reported by the
teachers. Participants were randomly assigned to the Co-
occurrence Training condition (N = 19), the Frequency Training
condition (N = 21), or the No Training Baseline condition
(N = 21).
Materials
Language materials consisted of four label triads, with each triad
comprised of a Target item, a Category-choice item, and a Lure
(see Table 1). Two of the triads referred to natural kind items
and the other two referred to artifacts. Target and Category-
choice items represented a subset of language materials used in
a prior study (Fisher et al., 2011). This subset of items was chosen
because prior research confirmed that: (1) older children and
adults generalize properties from Targets to Category-choice test
items for the chosen synonyms (Fisher et al., 2011); (2) 4-year-
old children are highly familiar with the Target and Category-
choice items (i.e., in prior work, 4-year-old children exhibited
an average accuracy of 96.5% across Target and Category-choice
items when presented with a picture identification task similar to
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test; Dunn andDunn, 1997); and
(3) these labels never co-occurred in the five CHILDES databases
we examined, indicating that they are unlikely to co-occur in
child-directed speech.
To-be-generalized properties consisted of two-syllable blank
predicates. Lures were selected on the basis that they were of the
same ontological kind as the Target and Category-choice items,
but of a different basic level category (similar to the lures used
in Gelman and Markman, 1986). To confirm that the Target
items were more semantically similar to the Category-choice
items than to the Lures, we conducted a separate calibration
study with a group of 18 adults. Adults were asked to rate the
semantic similarity of label pairs on a 7 point scale, with “7”
indicating that the labels could be used interchangeably, and
“1” indicating that the labels had no overlap in meaning. There
were 144 filler label pairs and 12 experimental label pairs. Filler
pairs consisted of a range of labels, some expected to be high
in semantic similarity (e.g., alligator—crocodile), items expected
to be medium in semantic similarity (e.g., alligator—octopus),
and items expected to be low in semantic similarity (e.g.,
alligator—telephone)2. Experimental label pairs consisted of all
2Ratings for filler pairs were used in a calibration of labels for a separate study
(Fisher et al., 2015).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 11463
Matlen et al. Co-occurrence and semantic similarity on inductive generalization
FIGURE 1 | Schematic depiction of the Co-occurrence Training speech
stream (top) and Frequency Training speech stream (bottom).
Target and Category-choice items used in the present study (e.g.,
dolphin-whale; four label pairs) and all Target and Lure items (e.g.,
dolphin-seal and whale-seal; eight label pairs); experimental label-
pairs were randomly interspersed among the filler label-pairs.
Participants’ scores were averaged across all Target and Category-
choice items and across all Target and Lure items. Results of the
calibration confirmed that Target and Category-choice items used
in the present study were rated as more semantically similar to
each other (M= 5.86) than to the Lures (M= 4.22), paired-sample
t (17)= 8.5, p < 0.001.
To create the Co-occurring speech stream in which Target
and Category-choice items co-occurred, a female native English
speaker was recorded pronouncing each of the four semantically
similar label-pairs individually3. Each recording was then edited
to last approximately one second in duration and these recordings
were used to create a speech stream in which each semantically
similar label-pair occurred a total of 75 times. A short pause that
lasted approximately 500 ms was included in between each label-
pair, and label-pairs were arranged such that they had an equal
probability of occurring next to any other label-pair (33%; see
Figure 1). The speech stream lasted for a total of 7.5 min.
To create the Frequency speech stream in which Target and
Category-choice items did not co-occur, all possible combinations
of Target and Category-choice items from the Co-occurring
stream were used, but were rearranged such that Targets
were never paired with their Category-choice item: Instead,
Targets were paired with the Category-choice items of the other
semantically similar pairs. For example, the word “dolphin” was
paired with the words “hill,” “mitten,” and “couch,” whereas the
word “whale” was paired with the words “mountain,” “glove,” and
3Statistical learning studies are often designed such that transitional
probabilities are the only cues to word boundaries. Given that the focus of the
current studies was on generalization rather than word segmentation, we did
not eliminate co-articulation cues from the speech stream, as these cues are
undoubtedly present for the label-pairs which co-occur in natural language.
“sofa.” The same female native English speaker that produced
the Co-occurring stream was recorded pronouncing each label-
pair individually (there were 12 label-pairs in total) and each
recording was then edited to last approximately one second in
duration. A speech stream was then created in which each label-
pair occurred a total of 25 times: therefore, each individual label
occurred a total of 75 times (the same label frequency as in the
Co-occurrence Training condition). A short pause that lasted
approximately 500 ms was included in between each label-pair,
and the label-pairs were arranged such that any given label never
occurred directly adjacent to its semantically similar counterpart
(see Figure 1). As in the Co-occurring stream, the Frequency
speech stream lasted a total of 7.5 min.
Visual stimuli for the induction task consisted of three sets of
doors, with each set including three identical doors. Participants
were told that the objects were hiding behind each of the doors.
The objects were never depicted. This procedure was utilized to
ensure that semantic similarity was the only source of information
on which to base inferences (Fisher et al., 2011; Godwin et al.,
2013).
Procedure
Children were tested individually in a quiet room at their school.
Children were randomly assigned to the Co-occurrence Training,
Frequency Training, or the No Training Baseline conditions. The
experiment consisted of two parts: a listening phase and an
induction phase. Only children in the Co-occurrence Training
and the Frequency Training conditions participated in the
listening phase, whereas all children participated in the induction
phase. In the listening phase, the experimenter told children that
they would be coloring pictures and that afterward, that they
would play a game. Coloring was chosen as an activity as it
does not require verbal working memory resources and therefore
did not interfere with their potential to process the speech
stream. At the same time, this activity kept children entertained
for the duration of the speech stream. Once children began
coloring, the experimenter started playing the speech stream on
a laptop computer. Children were exposed to either the Co-
occurrence speech stream or the Frequency speech stream based
on the child’s condition assignment. The listening phase lasted
for a total of 7.5 min, which was chosen because pilot work
suggested that children could remain on task for this duration
of time.
In the induction phase, the experimenter told children that
they were going to play a game where they would be told about
different objects hiding behind doors, and that they would be
asked a question about the objects. On each trial, the Target item
was always hidden behind the topmost door, and the location
of the Category-choice item and Lure (to the bottom left or to
the bottom right of the target) was randomized across trials. The
experimenter first introduced the target item (e.g., There is a
dolphin hiding behind this door) and then introduced the other
test items in random order (e.g., There is a seal hiding behind this
door. There is a whale hiding behind this door). Children were
then told about the property of the target item (e.g., The dolphin
has omat inside) and were asked to generalize this property to
one of the test items (e.g., Which do you think has omat inside
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FIGURE 2 | Mean proportion of category-consistent responses by
condition in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors of the
means. The dotted line indicates chance performance.
like this dolphin, the whale or the seal?)4. The presentation order
of Category-choice items and Lures was counterbalanced across
trials. Participants were allowed to respond either by verbally
labeling one of the test items or by pointing to one of the test doors.
In total, children completed eight trials, two trials for each of the
four semantically similar label-pairs. Trials were presented in one
of two pseudorandom orders (either trials 1–8 in Table 1, or the
reverse order).
Results and Discussion
To compare children’s performance against chance level, the
proportion of choices of the Category-choice items was calculated
for each participant and averaged across participants within each
condition. In the Frequency Training (M = 0.55, SD = 0.21)
and No Training Baseline (M = 0.53, SD = 0.18) conditions, the
proportion of Category-choice responses did not exceed chance
level (0.50), one-sample ts< 1.17, ps> 0.25. However, in the Co-
occurrence Training condition (M = 0.67, SD = 0.21), children’s
rate of selecting Category-choice items was significantly greater
than chance, t(18)= 3.70, p < 0.005 (see Figure 2).
We compared performance between conditions using logit
mixed effects regression using the lme4 package in R (Bates et al.,
2013). This analysis has been used in prior developmental research
(e.g., Ping and Goldin-Meadow, 2010) and is recommended
over ANOVA as it can account for the nesting of individual
trials within subjects, as well as handle binary outcomes (i.e.,
either synonym = 1 or lure = 0) (Jaeger, 2008). A varying-
intercept model predicted the likelihood of category responses
using condition as a fixed effect and a random effect of subject
(log-likelihood =  326.19, BIC = 677.14). This model was
significantly different from an unconditional model that included
4The wording “has X inside” was used for both artifact and natural kind labels
because prior work (Fisher et al., 2011) suggested that children’s inductive
generalization was not affected by subtle changes in question wording (e.g.,
“has X inside” vs. “is made of X”).
TABLE 2 | Summary of the fixed effects in the mixed logit model predicting
performance on the induction task in Experiment 1
(N = 61, log-likelihood =  326.2, BIC = 677.1). Co-occurrence Training
condition served as the baseline in the model.
b SE Wald Z p
Intercept 0.77 0.20 3.86 0.001*
No training baseline condition  0.65 0.27  2.41 <0.05*
Frequency training condition  0.54 0.27  2.04 <0.05*
* significant at alpha < 0.05.
only the random effect of subject (2 = 6.45, p = 0.04; log-
likelihood =  329.42, BIC = 671.21). The varying-intercept
model was also not statistically different from a model that
included condition as a fixed effect and a random intercept
and triad slope for each subject (2 = 8.59, p = 0.48; log-
likelihood= 321.89, BIC= 724.26) indicating that the inclusion
of triad in themodel does not improve themodel fit. Using theCo-
occurrence Training condition as a baseline, the varying-intercept
model showed a significant effect of the No Training Baseline
condition (b =  0.65, SE = 0.27, p = 0.01) and the Frequency
Training condition (b =  0.55, SE = 0.27, p = 0.04) indicating
that childrenwere less likely to choose synonym responses in these
conditions relative to the Co-occurrence Training condition (see
Table 2 for a summary of fixed effects results). This effect was
of medium size for the comparison with the Frequency Training
condition, Cohen’s d = 0.57, and the No Training Baseline
condition, Cohen’s d = 0.72.
To test whether children in the No Training Baseline condition
performed significantly different than children in the Frequency
Training condition, we reran the model using the No-Training
Baseline condition as the baseline. We found no effect of the
Frequency Training condition (b = 0.10, SE = 0.25, p > 0.69),
suggesting that children were not more likely to choose synonym
responses in the Frequency Training condition relative to the No
Training Baseline condition.
Due to the limited number of items, a proper item analysis
was not possible. Nevertheless, there were no differences between
performance on natural kind and artifact items (paired-sample
t = 0.46, p = 0.65), which is consistent with prior findings (e.g.,
Fisher et al., 2011).
To summarize, children’s performance on the property
induction task did not exceed chance level unless semantic
similarity information was combined with co-occurrence
information (Co-occurrence Training). Moreover, training
condition significantly predicted children’s induction
performance: Children in the Co-occurrence Training condition
were more likely to choose the Category-choice response options
than children in the Frequency Training condition and the No
Training Baseline condition. The findings of this Experiment
provide direct evidence that label co-occurrence affects inductive
generalization in preschool-age children.
One outstanding question concerns whether co-occurrence
information is sufficient for altering children’s generalization
or whether co-occurrence statistics of the input interact with
semantic similarity. We address this question in Experiment 2,
in which we exposed children to a speech stream in which non-
semantically similar labels co-occurred. Specifically, we took the
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Lures and one of the Synonymous labels from each of the triads
in Experiment 1 and paired them together so that they co-
occurred in a speech stream (e.g., seal-dolphin). After children
listened to the speech stream, they participated in the inductive
generalization task in which the Lure from Experiment 1 (e.g.,
seal) was described as having the novel property, and children
were asked to generalize this property to one of the synonymous
labels (e.g., dolphin orwhale), only one of which was trained in the
co-occurrence speech stream (e.g., dolphin). This design allowed
us to control for the effect of semantic similarity between the lure
and two synonymous labels, therefore isolating the effect of co-
occurrence on inductive generalization. If children’s performance
is affected by the co-occurrence of Target and Lure items,
this would provide evidence in support of the Co-occurrence-
Only hypothesis. Specifically, this finding would suggest that
co-occurrence effects observed in prior inductive generalization
studies were likely due to lexical priming of the category choice
item by the target item. In contrast, if co-occurrence of
Target and Lure items is not sufficient to affect children’s
induction performance, this would provide evidence in support
of the Interaction hypothesis. Such a finding would suggest
that effects observed in prior inductive generalization studies
stemmed from co-occurrence increasing semantic similarity of
co-occurring synonyms. In addition to distinguishing between
these possibilities, Experiment 2 also sought to replicate the main
finding of Experiment 1 (i.e., the effect of co-occurrence training
with semantically similar labels on children’s induction).
Experiment 2
Materials and Methods
Participants
Participants were 54 four-year-old children (M = 4.55 years,
SD = 0.35 years, 24 females, 30 males) recruited from preschools
in a large metropolitan area. The Institutional Review Board
at Carnegie Mellon University approved the study, and
parents/guardians of all children provided informed written
consent before participation. Two children were excluded
from analysis because of experimenter error. Participants were
randomly assigned to the Synonym Co-occurrence Training
condition (N = 18), the Non-Synonym Co-Occurrence Training
condition (N = 16), or the No Training Baseline condition
(N = 18).
Materials and Procedure
There were three between-subject conditions in Experiment 2: the
Non-Synonym Co-occurrence Training condition, the Synonym
Co-occurrence training condition, and the No Training Baseline
condition. The latter two conditions were included to determine
if the results of Experiment 1 would replicate with regards to
the effect of co-occurrence training of synonymous labels on
children’s inductive generalization. For these conditions (i.e.,
Synonym Co-Occurrence Training and No Training Baseline) the
materials and procedure were identical to those in Experiment
1. For the Non-Synonym Co-occurrence Training condition, a
speech stream was created that consisted of the Lures used in
Experiment 1 and one of the labels from each synonym-pair
(e.g., seal–whale, forest–hill, chair-couch, and sweater-mitten). The
same female speaker from Experiment 1 recorded the label pairs.
The label-pairs were sequenced within a speech stream such
that trained label-pairs exhibited 100% co-occurrence probability
to each other and 33% co-occurrence probability to any other
pair. Each label occurred a total of 75 times (i.e., with the same
frequency as in Experiment 1). The speech stream lasted a total
of 7.5 min in duration (i.e., the same duration as the Synonym
Co-Occurrence speech stream).
Only children in the Non-Synonym Co-Occurrence
Training and the Synonym Co-Occurrence Training conditions
participated in the listening phase. All children participated in the
induction task. For the SynonymCo-Occurrence Training andNo
Training Baseline conditions, the induction task was identical to
Experiment 1. For the Non-Synonym Co-Occurrence condition,
children completed a modified version of the induction task in
which the Target items consisted of the Lures from Experiment
1, and the Test items consisted of the two semantically similar
labels from Experiment 1. For example, children could be told
that a “Seal” had “Creighan” inside and asked which of the two
Test items—the “Whale” (i.e., Trained item) or the “Dolphin”
(i.e., Untrained item)—also had “Creighan” inside. To ensure that
children did not exhibit a bias to choose either of the Trained
or Untrained items prior to training, a separate group of 16
four-year-old children (M = 4.33, SD = 0.23) completed the
Non-Synonym induction task without listening to the Non-
Synonym Co-Occurrence speech stream. The results indicated
that children did not choose the to-be-trained test items at levels
greater than chance (M = 0.51, SD= 0.13, p > 0.81).
Results and Discussion
In order to compare children’s performance against chance level,
the proportion of choices of the Trained Test items was calculated
for each participant and averaged across participants within
each condition. In the Synonym Co-Occurrence Training and
No Training Baseline Conditions, the Trained Test items were
synonymous labels (e.g., dolphin-whale). In the Non-Synonym
Co-Occurrence Training condition, the Trained Test items were
non-synonymous labels (e.g., seal-whale).
The proportion of Trained item choices in the Non-Synonym
Co-Occurrence Training condition of Experiment 2 did not
exceed chance [M = 0.49, SD = 0.17; t(15) = < 1, ns],
suggesting that co-occurrence alone is not sufficient to induce
category-consistent generalization. As in Experiment 1, children’s
performance in the Synonym Co-occurrence Training condition
was significantly greater than chance (M = 0.69, SD= 0.22), one-
sample t(17) = 3.69, p < 0.005 (see Figure 3). The proportion of
Category-choice responses in the No Training Baseline condition
(M = 0.57, SD = 0.15) was not significantly above chance, one-
sample t(17)= 1.97, p= 0.07.
To compare performance between conditions within
Experiment 2, we predicted the likelihood of trained responses
using a fixed effect for condition and a random effect for
subject (log-likelihood =  276.55, BIC = 577.21). This model
was significantly different from an unconditional model that
included only the random effect of subject (2 = 9.91, p = 0.007;
log-likelihood =  281.5, BIC = 575.06). The model was also
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FIGURE 3 | Mean proportion of trained responses by condition in
Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors of the means. The dotted
line indicates chance performance.
TABLE 3 | Summary of the fixed effects in the mixed logit model predicting
performance on the induction task in Experiment 2 (N = 52,
log-likelihood =  276.5, BIC = 577.2). Co-occurrence Training condition
served as the baseline in the model.
b SE Wald Z p
Intercept 0.79 0.19 4.28 <0.001*
No training baseline condition  0.51 0.25  2.03 <0.05*
Non-synonym co-occurrence training
condition
 0.82 0.26  3.18 =0.001*
* significant at alpha < 0.05.
not statistically different from a model that included the fixed
effect of condition and a random intercept and triad slope for
each subject (2 = 3.4, p = 0.94; log-likelihood =  274.84,
BIC = 628.09) indicating that accounting for triad-type does
not improve the model fit. Using the Synonyms Co-occurrence
Training condition as a baseline, the varying-intercept model
showed a significant effect of the No Training Baseline condition
(b =  0.51, SE = 0.25, p = 0.04) and the Non-Synonym
Co-occurrence Training condition (b =  0.82, SE = 0.26
p = 0.001) indicating that children were less likely to choose
trained responses in these conditions relative to the Synonym
Co-occurrence Training condition (see Table 3 for a summary of
fixed effects results). This effect was large for the comparison with
the Non-Synonym Co-Occurrence Training condition, Cohen’s
d = 1.02, and medium for the No Training Baseline condition,
Cohen’s d = 0.64.
To test whether children in the No Training Baseline condition
performed significantly different than children in the Non-
Synonym Co-Occurrence Training condition, we reran the model
using the No-Training Baseline condition as the baseline in the
model. We found no effect of the Non-Synonym Co-Occurrence
Training condition (b =  0.31, SE = 0.25, p = 0.21). There were
also no differences between performance on natural kind and
artifact items (paired-sample t = 0.64, p= 0.53).
In summary, results of Experiment 2 replicate the results
from Experiment 1 and extend these findings in important ways.
As in Experiment 1, children in the Synonym Co-Occurrence
Training condition outperformed children in the No Training
Baseline condition by giving a higher proportion of Category-
choice responses. However, we found no evidence that co-
occurrence information alone—in the absence of substantial
semantic overlap—influenced young children’s generalization
behavior, as children in the Non-Synonym Co-occurrence
Training condition were equally likely to choose the untrained
semantically-dissimilar labels (e.g., dolphin-seal) as the trained
semantically-dissimilar labels (e.g., whale-seal) in the property
induction task. Importantly, it is unlikely that children made a
pragmatic guess about the goal of the co-occurrence training and
strategically chose the co-occurring items during the induction
task: if this were the case, it is not clear why children would make
this pragmatic choice in the Co-Occurring Synonyms condition
(Experiments 1–2) but not in the Co-Occurring Non-Synonyms
condition (Experiment 2).
General Discussion
The results of the reported experiments replicate the prior findings
that preschool-age children are unlikely to use the semantic
similarity of labels to make inferences with labels that do not
co-occur in the English language (i.e., No Training Baseline
condition in Experiments 1–2 and Frequency Training condition
in Experiment 1 of this manuscript; Fisher, 2010; Fisher et al.,
2011, 2015; Godwin et al., 2013). At the same time, the present
findings provide the first direct evidence that combining semantic
similarity with co-occurrence information leads to an increase
in category-consistent responding on a property induction task.
In other words, a short training session that did not impart
any new knowledge onto children but instead established an
association between semantically similar labels led children to
prefer category-choice items to lures on a property induction
task. These findings suggest that effects previously reported in
the literature (Gelman and Markman, 1986; Fisher et al., 2011;
Godwin et al., 2013) can be at least partially attributed to label
co-occurrence.
Importantly, results of Experiment 2 help to clarify the
mechanisms of this co-occurrence effect. Specifically, brief co-
occurrence training was not sufficient to promote generalization
in the absence of substantial semantic overlap. The duration of
co-occurrence training in the present studies was brief and it
is possible that longer co-occurrence training of semantically
dissimilar items may influence children’s generalization behavior.
Nonetheless, the same brief co-occurrence training was sufficient
to influence property induction for semantically similar items, the
effect that was observed in both Experiment 1 and 2. Therefore,
results of Experiment 2 undermine the Co-occurrence-Only
hypothesis, which suggests that children’s success in making
inductive inferences with co-occurring semantically similar labels
is due to associative lexical priming (Fisher, 2010; Fisher et al.,
2011).
Lexical priming occurs when a response to a word is influenced
by its preceding linguistic context. These effects have been
observed in a number of tasks, including lexical decision, word
naming, and object naming among others (for review and
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discussion, see Jones and Estes, 2012). Researchers commonly
distinguish between semantic and associative priming, among
several other types of priming. Associative priming occurs when
responses are influenced by local (i.e., immediate) co-occurrence
of words that tend to occur together in linguistic context but
not necessarily share meaning (e.g., “fire-truck”). Pure semantic
priming refers to effects that are driven only by similarity in
meaning and not by other types of relations (e.g., “dog-wolf ”).
Associative and semantic priming differ in their time course (i.e.,
semantic priming effects decay faster than associative priming
effects), suggesting differences in processing of semantic and
associative relations (Jones and Estes, 2012). Importantly, these
two types of priming may also have different developmental
trajectories. Specifically, priming based on associative relations
has been shown in children as young as 24 months of age
(Arias-Trejo and Plunkett, 2013). However, the evidence of purely
semantic priming is mixed, with some studies reporting semantic
priming effects in 24-month-olds (Arias-Trejo and Plunkett,
2013), whereas other studies report associative but not semantic
priming effects at 6 years of age (McCauley et al., 1976). When
semantic and associative relations are combined, evidence of
priming has been observed in children as young as 21-months of
age (Arias-Trejo and Plunkett, 2009), and even in adults semantic
priming effects are stronger in the presence of association (Moss
et al., 1995).
The above factors led Fisher (2010) and Fisher et al. (2011)
to hypothesize that effects of co-occurring semantically similar
labels on inductive generalization in preschoolers may stem
largely from associations established by co-occurrence, rather
than from the shared meaning of labels. However, results
of Experiment 2 undermine this hypothesis. Instead, these
results support the Interaction hypothesis, suggesting that label
co-occurrence and semantic similarity interact to influence
preschoolers’ inductive generalization performance.
As discussed in the introduction, semantic similarity can be
extracted from linguistic context on the basis of long-range
co-occurrence statistics of the input (for review, see Bullinaria
and Levy, 2007). Consistent with this notion, Shapiro et al.
(2012) recently demonstrated that spatiotemporal co-occurrence
increases similarity of visual object representations in the medial
temporal lobe in adult participants. In the present experiments, we
used labels that have a high overlap in meaning but are unlikely
to immediately co-occur in child-directed speech. It is likely
that limitations in working and short-term memory preclude
preschool-age (and younger) children from extracting semantic
similarity from long-range co-occurrence statistics in the natural
language (and even short-range co-occurrence statistics, i.e., the
Frequency Control condition in Experiment 1). At the same
time, immediate co-occurrences induced by the Synonym Co-
occurrence Training condition in Experiments 1–2 may have
increased semantic similarity of Target and Category-choice
items, enabling children to make category-consistent responses.
It is possible that developmental improvement in working and
short-term memory allow older children to build and refine
semantic representations based on long-range co-occurrences in
linguistic input. Initial evidence supporting this possibility has
been recently reported by Vlach and Johnson (2013) who found
that 16-month-old infants succeeded in mapping novel words to
referents only when novel labels were presented on a massed but
not on an interleaved training schedule. Trials involving novel
words and referents were presented in immediate succession in
the massed condition, but were separated by other items in the
interleaved condition. However, at 20-months of age, infants were
able to learn the novel words in both massed and interleaved
conditions. It may seem implausible that 20-month-olds are able
to learn new words in an interleaved learning schedule but
preschoolers have trouble extracting semantic similarity of non-
co-occurring labels. However, in Vlach and Johnson’s (2013)
study the linguistic context was relatively simple (i.e., two novel
labels and referents). Furthermore, mapping a novel label to a
referent is only a first step in building semantic representations.
Therefore, the contribution of memory development to children’s
ability to build semantic representations based on mid- and long-
range co-occurrence statistics in natural language remains to be
examined in future research.
Broader Theoretical Implications
Prior research has documented that children can make novel
inferences beginning in early infancy (e.g., Mandler and
McDonough, 1996; Rakison, 2007). However, it remains
uncertain how children accomplish this important task and
whether they accomplish it in a way that is fundamentally similar
to the way in which adults and older children would accomplish
an analogous task. A dominant view of children’s inductive
generalization characterizes it as a category-based reasoning
process, akin to that performed by adults (Gelman andMarkman,
1986; Gelman and Coley, 1990; Jaswal and Markman, 2007).
According to this theoretical perspective, children are “initially
biased” to believe that labels refer to kinds, and that items of
similar kind are likely to have similar unobservable properties
(Gelman and Markman, 1986, p. 207; see also Gelman and Coley,
1990; Welder and Graham, 2001; Gelman, 2003). In the course
of induction, children first determine which of the presented
entities belong to the same category and then make an inference
on the basis of this categorization.
An alternative perspective suggests that induction is a process
of automatic generalization supported by overall featural
similarity in children (e.g., Sloutsky and Fisher, 2004, 2012) and
in many circumstances in adults as well (Sloman, 1993, 1996).
It has been shown that in infancy categories are based on the
distributions of perceptual features (e.g., Younger and Cohen,
1986; Rakison and Butterworth, 1998; French et al., 2004). In the
world outside the lab, category members have many perceptual
features in common; therefore, perceptual groupings built in
infancy can support the formation of semantic categories as
children learn through direct and indirect experience (e.g.,
books, TV, etc.) other features that are correlated with perceptual
features (e.g., “balls roll,” “birds lay eggs,” etc.) (cf. Smith and
Heise, 1992). Within this theoretical perspective, induction is
not based on the consideration of which category includes the
presented items, but on the summed featural similarity weighted
by the salience of auditory labels in case of infants and young
children (for discussion, see Sloutsky and Fisher, 2004, 2012).
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In the case of preschool-age children’s inductive generalization
behavior, the studies reported in this paper are partially
inconsistent with both theories. Specifically, a naïve theory
account cannot explain why the majority of children do not
spontaneously produce category-based responses in absence of
association-based training. Alternatively, a purely association-
based account cannot explain why children do not respond based
on trained associations, in the absence of semantic similarity.
Instead, these findings are more consistent with a modified view
that acknowledges both the roles of semantic and perceptual
information in children’s inductive generalization.
The suggestion that both category knowledge and
association/similarity contribute to children’s generalization
behavior has been articulated by other developmental scientists
(Waxman and Gelman, 2009). However, an ongoing debate
concerns whether innate starting points (i.e., naïve theories) are
necessary to explain children’s generalization behavior from birth
to early childhood. The present findings are inconsistent with the
possibility that category-based induction in children is an “initial
bias” (Gelman and Markman, 1986). Specifically, without the co-
occurrence training, the majority of 4 year-old children did not
make category-consistent inferences about highly-familiar items.
At the same time, the present findings are consistent with
a recently proposed theoretical account of the development
of children’s inductive generalization. The Perceptual and
Representational Similarity (PaRS; Fisher et al., 2015) account
proposes that both knowledge and perceptual information
contribute to the development of children’s inductive
generalization. However, the PaRS account makes a distinction
between knowledge gained through experience (i.e., semantic
knowledge) and knowledge people may have “independent of
experience” (Gelman and Markman, 1986, p. 207), such as
essentialist beliefs or naïve theories (see also Gelman, 2003).
Whereas the PaRS account endorses the influence of semantic
knowledge in preschool children’s generalization behavior, it
argues against the necessity to posit the existence of innate
knowledge to account for children’s inductive inferences. In the
present paper, we suggest that the co-occurrence training may
have increased the representational similarity of the Target and
Category-choice items in the semantic space (cf. Shapiro et al.,
2012), an interpretation that is consistent with the PaRS account.
Summary
The findings presented in this paper provide the first experimental
evidence that label co-occurrence has a direct effect on inferences
made by preschool-age children. Specifically, exposing 4-year-
old children to a stream of words in which semantically
similar labels were adjacent to each other increased category-
consistent responding on a property induction task. At the
same time, co-occurrence training with semantically dissimilar
labels did not influence children’s generalizations, suggesting an
interaction between semantic similarity and label co-occurrence.
These findings provide support for the hypothesis that label
co-occurrence increases semantic similarity of representations,
thus promoting category-consistent responding on an inductive
inference task. Future research is necessary to examine a corollary
prediction of this account, namely that developmental increases
in working and short-term memory enable children to take
advantage of mid- and long-range co-occurrences in linguistic
input to form and refine semantic representations.
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